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Abstract: After more than three decades of armed conflict, Sri Lanka continues to struggle to meet internal 
and external demands, which call for independent, transparent and accountable mechanisms to address 
human rights abuses and past mass atrocities. When authoritarian President Mahinda Rajapaksa was 
ousted in the January 2015 Presidential election by an unexpected rival, optimism for a more cooperative 
approach surged. However, this paper argues that the current government has outlined political 
distinctions between Sirisena and Rajapaksa, but their positions on key reconciliation mechanisms are 
comparative. It demonstrates this through a review of political documents and policy positions, and 
provides an analysis of statements, commitments, and engagements made internally and at the 
international level, presented in contrast with contradictory remarks made by Sri Lankan authorities.  
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Introduction 
During former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Colombo in May 2015, he urged his Sri Lankan 
counterpart to work towards a credible human rights investigation that satisfied international and domestic 
legitimacy concerns. (Morello, 2015) Kerry addressed a newly-elected government, swept into office in 
an unexpected electoral victory. (Cronin-Furman, 2015) Maithripala Sirisena, a former health minister, 
assumed office by developing a center-right coalition (Burke, 2015) of rural conservatives and urban 
elites—beating his former ally, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had ruled the island nation for a decade.  
 
Kerry’s message was conciliatory. On the one hand, he called for the same kinds of reforms that his 
predecessor, Hillary Clinton had called for—namely democratic reforms, a pathway to national 
reconciliation, and mechanisms that could potentially offer justice to thousands of victims of alleged 
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human rights violations and mass atrocities. (Uyangoda, 2010,  p. 105) On the other hand, he heaped praise 
on Sri Lanka’s existing institutions and acknowledged that the timetable to reconciliation would be long. 
Kerry likely operated on two assumptions, that the defeat of Rajapaksa was a partial rejection of 
Rajapaksa’s brand nationalism and authoritarianism that had dominated his tenure in office or, Sirisena’s 
election was the consequence of a regime that had mismanaged its hold on power, with the opposition 
fueling legitimate long-standing concerns over corruption and nepotism. (DeVotta, 2013)  
 
In reality, Sirisena benefited from Rajapaksa’s political troubles. A significant factor in his victory came 
from the support of the Tamil people, who voted in high numbers in the northeast and center of the country. 
After it was rumored that Muslim and Tamil political parties were going to back the opposition, the 
majority United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) claimed the new coalition was a “conspiracy.” (“Sri 
Lanka fears attempts to divide country”, 2014) The feud between the two major candidates was real, even 
their political promises were suspect. The question before Kerry and the West was whether there were 
policy differences as well as political divisions.  
 
Optimism for a more cooperative government dramatically increased at a September 2015 meeting of the 
UN Human Rights Council, where the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) addressed Member States in 
Geneva and detailed a departure from the policies of the former government. Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister, 
Mangala Samaraweera, proposed several sweeping changes and reforms, including a new constitution, an 
office for missing persons, a judicial mechanism and a new truth and reconciliation commission: 
 
“Therefore, I say to the sceptics: don’t judge us by the broken promises, experiences and u-turns 
of the past. Let us design, define and create our future by our hopes and aspirations, and not be 
held back by the fears and prejudices of the past. (“Sri Lanka’s Response to the UNHRC”, 2015) 
 
The Geneva speech preempted a report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) detailing abuses by both the Rajapaksa government and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and calling for an special court to investigate them. 
Samaraweera announced that key mechanisms, such as the constitution and the reconciliation commission 
would be implemented with special input from South Africa, whose 1994 reconciliation efforts have 
crystallized the legitimacy of similar processes in the eyes of the international community.  
 
A May 2016 New York Times article underscores the wave of optimism surrounding Sirisena’s surprise 
victory. Drawing upon the conclusion that his coalition of minority groups and his “agreeable and self-
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effacing” nature, (Anand & Bastians, 2016) it extols the view that he is a political moderate. Others have 
gone much farther. At the August 2016 LawAsia conference, Upul Jayasuriya, Chairman of the Board of 
Investment of Sri Lanka, called President Sirisena “the Nelson Mandela of modern Sri Lanka.” 
(Jayasuriya, 2016). These assessments of Sirisena’s potential have been matched with early political 
victories curtailing presidential power in an amendment to the state constitution (Ramakrishnan, 2016), 
and alleviating fears of Chinese intrusion on the island. He also presented a more balanced foreign policy 
towards Xi Jinping, as well as smoothing over his predecessor’s diplomatic missteps with India, and the 
West. (Gunaratne & Miller, 2015). The Government has made some advances in returning some Tamil 
lands, seized by the military between 1982 and 2009. In March 2016, approximately 700 acres of land was 
returned in Thelippalei and Kopai (Perera, 2016).  
 
However, the Mandela narrative is premature. Critics have pointed to the facts that Sirisena performed 
duties as acting defense minister during the final weeks of the military campaign against the LTTE 
(Medhora, 2015) and that reluctance to release hundreds of Tamil political prisoners (Dibbert, 2016b), 
demonstrates a reluctance on the part of the Government to meet Tamil demands or risk alienating key 
Sinhala voting blocs. It is this political dichotomy that peaks our interest. We suggest that the larger GoSL 
political narrative in offering a pathway to justice and accountability through mechanisms that involve the 
international community is misleading. We suggest that there has been little change in policy from the 
Rajapaksa era to the present administration. Divided into two sections, this paper examines Sri Lanka’s 
first attempt at national reconciliation and subsequent domestic political events leading up to the 2015 
Presidential election. We then provide a review of statements, commitments, and engagements made 
internally and at the international level, presented in contrast with seemingly contradictory remarks made 
by GoSL authorities.  
 
The End of Armed Conflict 
Armed conflict between the LTTE and the GoSL came to an end in May of 2009, after the military victory 
over the LTTE by the Armed Forces. Shortly thereafter, then-President Mahinda Rajapaksa announced 
that government forces had been successful, and were “liberated” from the bonds of terrorism. (Weaver & 
Chamberlain, 2009) As decades of armed conflict came to an abrupt end, the task of assessing the cost of 
war began. Rajapaksa announced plans to conduct a formal census (Francis, 2013) on costs associated 
with conflict, in accordance with a recommendation made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 
Commission (LLRC), began deploying tens of thousands of officials from the Department of Census and 
Statistics to visit homes and villages across the country. 
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Casualty figures have been longstanding sources of conflict between the GoSL and the international 
community, who have repeatedly called for independent investigations into victims and a host of other 
human rights abuses dating back to 1982. A March 2011 Report on the Secretary General’s Panel of 
Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka estimated that approximately 40,000 people died toward the end 
of the war in 2009, and independent estimates on the number of civilians killed could have exceeded 
100,000. Reports suggest that as many as 1 million Tamils have fled, while another 146,000 remain 
unaccounted for. (Wigneswaran, 2016) 
 
Isolation by the International Community 
When former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon visited Sri Lanka shortly after armed conflict ended, 
(Uyangoda, 2010, p. 106) a dispute began over how the GoSL would set up institutional mechanisms for 
justice and accountability. A joint statement reiterated that the Secretary-General emphasized the 
“importance of an accountability process for addressing violations of international humanitarian and 
human rights law.” (“Joint Statement”, 2009) Immediately, then-UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Navi Pillay urged an “independent and credible international investigation” into related events. 
Rajapaksa and his Indian allies pushed back, calling into question the legitimacy and the impartiality of 
the Human Rights chief (Chellaney, 2009). These initial exchanges prompted a back and forth by 
Rajapaksa and the Office of the High Commissioner, with one side suggesting that parties should absolve 
themselves to an international inquiry that is both open and transparent, hinting national justice institutions 
could not fully maintain their independence--and the other, in contrast suggesting that any approach should 
be locally managed and largely free from Western demands. These exchanges and positions would last 
throughout Rajapaksa’s decade as President--and has formed the basis for acrimony between the GoSL 
and the international community to date. 
 
The tenor of diplomacy between the international community and the GoSL has remained inharmonious 
since 2010. In June of that year, the UN Secretary General appointed a Panel of Experts (“Statement 
Attributable”, 2010) in hopes of drafting a more cooperative approach to justice and accountability 
mechanisms. The domestic alternative, the establishment of the LLRC fell short of the supposed standard, 
with the Panel of Experts Report calling it, “deeply flawed, [and] does not meet international standards 
for an effective accountability mechanism.” (“Panel Report”, v) The criticism lobbied at Sri Lanka and 
the LLRC is a relevant case study in the complicated dynamics of truth and reconciliation politics. Human 
rights groups such as Amnesty International charged that the LLRC was a deliberate attempt to circumvent 
the prospect of an international mechanism for transitional justice and accountability. (“Human Rights 
Groups”, 2010) 
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While Rajapaksa benefited from the spoils of war that came with the decisive military defeat of the LTTE 
in 2009, he was denounced by political opponents and the international community as obstinate. Following 
the LLRC report and recommendations in December 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
brought forward two resolutions: the first in March of 2012 (A/HRC/19/L.2), calling for implementation 
of the recommendations made by the LLRC, and again in March of 2013 (A/HRC/22/L.1/Rev.1), a more 
strongly worded resolution reiterating previous recommendations and insisting on an independent and 
credible investigation. Rajapaksa rejected both resolutions, remarking on the latter, that he was not 
surprised by the “attacks” on Sri Lanka and linked the strategies by Western countries that sponsored the 
resolution to pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora. (“Sri Lanka Undeterred”, 2013) 
 
Rajapaksa’s authoritarian streak became more pronounced and political opponents began seizing upon his 
strongman characteristics. Sri Lanka hosted the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, of 
which Rajapaksa was chair, but the occasion was marked by local Tamil protesters (Dominiczak, 2013) 
and a boycott by fellow members, India, Canada, and Mauritius. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
decried Rajapaksa’s “absence of accountability for the serious violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian standards during and after the civil war”. (Milewski, 2013) His counterpart in India, then-
Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh declined to attend based on outcry in neighboring Tamil Nadu state, 
and potential political consequences for neglecting the interests of minority voters in the 2014 elections. 
(Burke & Sparrow, 2013) 
 
Regime Change 
The current coalition government came to power on a platform change, commonly referred to now as the 
“reform agenda.” (Uyangoda, 2015) On the surface, it bound Sirisena to his campaign agenda, or at the 
very least articulate policy differences between his new government and that of his predecessor and 
suggest a change in direction from the country’s decade-long lurch toward autocracy. Through this agenda, 
the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government has rather successful in ending Sri Lanka’s international 
isolation, achieved by neutralising demands for an independent international investigation into wartime 
mass atrocities and turning calls for international and hybrid mechanisms into more domestic, or 
nationally-controlled mechanisms. 
 
For example, in consideration of the new administration, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights delayed the release of a key report from its investigation on Sri Lanka, known more commonly as 
the OISL report. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein deferred on grounds 
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that the new government would be more cooperative or that new information could be brought to light 
(“UNHRC Chief Grants Deferral”, 2015). The deferral was met with disappointment by rights groups such 
as the Tamil Civil Society Forum, who charged that the delay was “completely unnecessary and [was] a 
possible final blow to any further search for accountability through international means” (“TCSF 
Expresses Disappointment over OISL Deferral”, 2015). While Rajapaksa was recalcitrant in his refusal to 
allow OISL special investigators from Geneva access into the country, Sirisena was only slightly more 
hospitable. It did not extend a welcome, but merely stated it would consider their expertise when creating 
a domestic inquiry.  
 
When the OISL Report was finally released in September 2015, Al Hussein recommended a hybrid special 
court to try war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by all parties to the armed 
conflict, reiterating past assessments that Sri Lanka’s domestic legal institutions did not have the capacity 
to handle “international crimes”, as well as expressing concerns that that the “State’s security sector and 
justice system [had] been distorted and corrupted by decades of impunity” (“Statement by UN High 
Commissioner”, 2015). It is important to distinguish that the OISL is a human rights investigation rather 
than a criminal proceeding, however the patterns of human rights violations, the OISL Report noted, were 
“deeply embedded” in the country and “may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity”. (“Report 
of the OHCHR”, 2015) 
 
In response, Sri Lanka co-sponsored Resolution 30/1, with the United States, which was adopted at the 
30th Session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in October 2015. The resolution affirmed calls 
to end the culture of impunity, ensure accountability for wartime mass atrocities and establish a 
commission for truth, justice, reconciliation and non-recurrence, an office of missing persons and an office 
for reparations. It also reiterated the importance of participation of international judges, prosecutors and 
investigators. However, it failed to reaffirm Al Hussein’s call to establish a hybrid special court, and 
instead supported the setup of a domestic mechanism with the inclusion of the alleged perpetrator, Sri 
Lanka. (“Resolution” 2015)  
 
Progress within the promises of Resolution 30/1 have stalled, with some exceptions, such as the release of 
some political prisoners and the establishment of the Constitutional Task Force on Reconciliation 
Mechanisms (CTF). The CTF was born out of the Resolution 30/1 process, created in early 2016 by 
Wickremesinghe to conduct public consultations on the design of four reconciliation mechanisms, a 
judicial mechanism (with a Special Counsel), a new truth and reconciliation commission, and the 
establishment of an office of Reparations and an Office on Missing Persons. (“Frequently Asked 
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Questions”, 2017) The CTF recommended a hybrid court of local and international judges to prosecute 
war crimes, and the establishment of the office of the Special Counsel. (“Final Report”, 2017) Within 
hours of the Report’s release, Cabinet Spokesman Rajitha Senaratne categorically rejected the hybrid 
recommendation, raising the eyebrows of Al Hussein, yet again. (“UN human rights chief”, 2017). The 
sentiment was echoed by Justice Minister Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, who expressed a lack of confidence in 
the CTF. (Pothmulla, 2017) Remarkably, the Prime Minister, who created the CTF, and the President were 
found to have abstained from the event where the CTF report was handed-over to the Chairperson of the 
Office for National Unity and Reconciliation. Their absence suggests that the CTF process was conducted 
by the government to portray progress to the international community, rather than a firm commitment to 
the reconciliation process.  
 
Transitional Justice 
The transitional justice process too has lacked transparency. Despite Al Hussein having urged for 
consultations with victims and the GoSL agreeing at the UNHRC to hold nationwide public consultations 
on all transitional justice mechanisms, the process has lacked in consultations and communications with 
the war survivors and victims. The creation of the Office of Missing Persons (OMP) was done without 
consultations with families of the disappeared (“Sri Lanka: Consultations Lacking”, 2016), and despite 
being hailed by Ministers as an act which would enhance prestige internationally (“Sri Lanka parliament 
passes bill”, 2016) it has been slammed by critics as a “total lie in practise” (Perera, 2016). 
 
Resolution 30/1 also called for the GoSL to review the Public Security Ordinance Act, and review and 
repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), replacing it with anti-terrorism legislation in accordance 
with contemporary international best practices. However, the draft framework of the ‘Counter Terrorism 
Act’ (CTA), the legislation intended to replace the draconian PTA, human rights campaigners, have 
suggested, is worse than PTA itself and far from international best practices (“Sri Lanka: Proposed”, 
2016). 
 
Legislation such as the Assistance to and Protection of Victims of Crime and Witnesses Act which is 
imperative for any justice system to challenge and put an end to the culture of impunity, is yet to be 
meaningfully implemented, and the timing of its enactment a mere two weeks before the 28th session of 
the UNHRC (Perez, 2015) adds to the notion that the GoSL has a culture of establishing commissions and 
enacting bills when international pressure emerges with little intention of implementing it. The OMP was 
created just prior to the 30th Session and three months before the 34th Session, the Cabinet accepted the 
President’s proposal for a ‘National Integration and Reconciliation Week’ in January (“Decisions Taken”, 
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2016) - a move critics argue is yet another cosmetic fix principally intended for international consumption, 
as senior journalist and political commentator, Kusal Perera noted, “[T]here’s lots of talking done on 
reconciliation while on the ground what’s done contradicts everything necessary for reconciliation.” 
(Dibbert, 2016c) 
 
This lack of political will by the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government towards full implementation of 
Resolution 30/1 and its delay in establishing transitional justice mechanisms including judicial 
proceedings to investigate and prosecute war crimes has not only raised serious questions among the victim 
community of the government’s intention and commitments towards justice, accountability and genuine 
reconciliation, but has begun to cause actors in the international community to view the GoSL as 
attempting to avoid delivering on truth and justice for war victims (Bastians, 2016).  
 
Culture of Impunity 
When the United Nations Committee of Torture (UNCAT) met in November 2016, human rights observers 
complained when the GoSL sent Sisira Mendis, the Chief of Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and 
Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) as a part of its official delegation. (Dibbert, 2016d) Critics pointed 
to his past involvement in the Rajapaksa government as head of the CID, an institution that the OISL 
Report detailed an extensive list of human rights allegations. The CID “Fourth Floor” facility in Colombo, 
the OISL noted, had an array of torture devices, such as barrels for waterboarding and devices from which 
to suspend detainees. (A/HRC/30/CRP.2, Para 553)  
 
Rather than finding a roadmap to ending Sri Lanka’s culture of impunity, there have been rather 
encouraging signs for culprits, despite promises to the international to the contrary. In July 2016, six 
military officials accused of taking part in a massacre of 26 Tamil civilians (including women and children) 
in Kumarapuram, Trincomalee in 1996 were acquitted by the Anuradhapura High Court. (“Kumarapuram 
judgement”, 2016). Soon after, the Colombo High Court acquitted and released all involved, (“Sri Lankan 
Court Acquits”, 2016) including three navy intelligence officials accused in the assassination of former 
Tamil Parliamentarian Nadaraja Raviraj in 2005. Such decisions have further added to victim mistrust of 
Sri Lanka’s judiciary mechanisms. 
 
Amnesty International has previously found state agents to have directly intervened in some cases in order 
to eliminate witnesses through use of bribes, threats, harassment, intimidation and violence, including 
murder, to discourage police investigations and mislead the public. It has accused the criminal justice 
system of being subject to political pressure, its critical shortcomings leading to the obstruction of justice 
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for victims (“Sri Lanka: Twenty Years of Make-Believe”, 2009) Furthermore, these concerns were echoed 
by Al Hussein’s remarks in 2015 on Sri Lanka’s inadequate domestic legal system, and its security and 
justice systems being entangled in corruption and impunity. 
 
Writing on war crimes tribunals, David Scheffer, the first U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes 
Issues (1997-2001) noted that “[i]f the tribunals’ work had been left to domestic courts, particularly in 
devastated societies, there simply would not have been any justice at all.” (Scheffer, 2) These statements 
not only highlight the importance of an independent international investigation, but underscores the Tamil 
lack of confidence in the capacity Sri Lanka’s justice system or in a domestic mechanism. 
 
Similar Policies and Positions 
While the Rajapaksa government was less diplomatic and more confrontational with the U.S.-led West, 
the incumbent Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government has appeared to be more conciliatory and less 
confrontational with the international community, including China. Foreign policy approaches and 
strategies may differ between the two administrations, yet there appears to be no shift in the Sri Lanka’s 
ethnocratic policies and practices (Balasundaram, 2016).  
 
Rajapaksa rejected accusations of major violations of international law during the final stages of the armed 
conflict and unequivocally objected any international participation including constructive engagement 
with the United Nations human rights bodies, with regard to wartime mass atrocities. The incumbent 
Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government, while not explicitly rejecting serious violations of international 
law, has opened the door for dialogue and engagement with the international community, and at the same 
time, stalling international participation in prescribed mechanisms under Resolution 30/1. The GoSL 
maintains an intractable position that the referenced international component is limited to technical advice 
and assistance, rather than full international participation in trials. (“Sri Lankan President: No 
Allegations”, 2016) 
 
While approaches, structures and processes may differ between Rajapaksa and Sirisena with regard to 
international participation on accountability and justice for wartime mass atrocities, their political goals 
remain very similar. Rajapaksa communicated in the same fashion nationally and internationally, in 
matters related to wartime atrocities and accountability mechanisms, isolating Sri Lanka from the West. 
The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration, on the other hand uses a more liberal tone internationally, 
while domestically, remains persistent that it had no intention of punishing perpetrators. This position has 
remained constant, during and after the 2015 Presidential election. For example, Sirisena boasted in his 
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campaign manifesto that he would “allow no international power to ill-treat or touch a single citizen of 
this country on account of the campaign to defeat terrorism” (Sirisena, 44), nor would he permit his 
predecessor, “his family or any member of our armed forces to be taken before any international war 
crimes tribunal” (“Sri Lanka opposition candidate”, 2014). In order to appease repeated calls for an 
international investigation, Sirisena also stated that he would launch a domestic war crimes inquiry, if 
elected. (Mallawarachi, 2014). Two years later, this promise has been reiterated by the Foreign Minister. 
(“The Reconciliation Process”, 2017). While persisting on the establishment of the domestic mechanism, 
Sirisena recently asked U.S. President Donald Trump to pressure the UNHRC to drop war crimes 
allegations against the country’s troops (“Sri Lanka seeks Donald Trump’s help”, 2016).  
 
In an interview to The Hindu in November 2016, Sirisena said:  
 
“Before I came to power there was a fear that those who had given commands during the war 
could be taken to international courts of justice, that they may even face execution, and that they 
may have to sit on the electric chair. The international community is so satisfied with my 
performance that they have completely changed their impression of the country. Now there is no 
threat of international courts, now we don’t have to talk about electric chairs, there is no problem 
[of foreign judges investigating alleged violation of human rights]; I have told the international 
community that I cannot accept any proposal that allows foreign judges to probe our domestic 
matters. This is another great victory I was able to achieve in this time.” (“Solving problems”, 
2016) 
 
Earlier, Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, too had explicitly ruled out the possibilities 
for international judges’ involvement and emphasised that any probe would be purely domestic (“Alleged 
war crimes”, 2016). Aware of the weaknesses and mistakes of its predecessor with regard to international 
engagement, the Government neither categorically rejects nor objects any international engagement. 
Rather, it has verbalised commitments, given rhetorical promises and delivered make-believe statements 
on international platforms while agreeing for engagements. However, despite failing to act upon 
commitments and delaying implementation of promises, it has managed to continue its engagement with 
the intention of mitigating international pressure. 
 
Conclusion 
While consecutive Sri Lankan governments may change their approaches to demands for accountability, 
there has been no paradigm shift in major policies given that the State has not shown willingness to have 
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punished any perpetrators of mass atrocities. The authoritarian tenor of the Rajapaksa administration may 
have dissipated and its diplomatic strategy altered, yet policy has remained constant as the Sirisena-
Wickremesinghe administration enters its third year in power. The CTF, which was an outcome of 
Resolution 30/1, has been dismissed by the very government that created it, stalling momentum with 
regard to national reconciliation and accountability. 
 
The Government’s proclamation of delivering justice through a domestic mechanism contradicts historical 
and ongoing realities. Failure to implement its own commitments adds strength to the criticism that like 
past governments, it too has neither the capacity, nor the political will to deliver justice to victims. Rather, 
it continues to engage in stalling measures with no indication of delivering justice. As long as Sri Lankan 
officials hold all decision-making authority, regardless if some international participation is allowed, any 
such mechanism will likely fail to deliver justice due to the positions of these consecutive governments, 
state institutions and various structures being strongly interconnected. 
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